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Abstract
We characterize axiomatically a stochastic choice model, the Consistent-Mistakes
Model (CMM), that describes an error-prone decision maker’s choices. In contrast
to random utility models, CMMs generate closed-form choice probability. Under the
axioms, we uniquely identify from the choices an expected utility function that rep-
resents the decision maker’s true preference and a propensity function that describes
how likely an alternative is to be chosen. We introduce a measure of error-proneness
and show that the logit model of mistakes is a CMM with a constant measure of error-
proneness, characterized by a strong version of the independence axiom from expected
utility theory. We analyze the properties of models of mistakes.
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1 Introduction
People often make mistakes. To study mistakes, we use models that permit choice random-
ness. One of the most prominent is the random utility model (Thurstone (1927)). When
it is used to model mistakes, the model says that each alternative i has true utility ui, but
the decision maker observes a noisy signal ui + εi. The decision maker chooses the alter-
native that has the highest signal. Since εi’s are random, the decision maker chooses each
alternative with some probability.
Although the random utility model of mistakes (RUMM) has been widely used in eco-
nomics, several issues remain unaddressed. First, how do we distinguish a model of mistakes
from a model of taste shocks? In a random utility model, we can interpret εi’s either as
noise or as taste shocks. If we interpret εi’s as taste shocks, the true utility of alternative i
is ui + εi. If we interpret εi’s as noise, the true utility of alternative i is ui. However, the two
interpretations seem to induce identical choice behavior. Hence, when we observe a decision
maker’s stochastic choices, it seems unclear whether we should attribute choice randomness
to mistakes or random taste shocks.
Second, imagine that we want to understand, in a textbook macroeconomic model, what
will happen if we allow decision makers to make mistakes. Suppose we introduce mistakes
into the textbook model via the RUMM. The original textbook model may be simple and
tractable, but the new model becomes intractable, because the choice probability generated
by the RUMM is not in closed form in general. Some RUMMs are tractable; for instance,
the widely used logit RUMM generates closed-form choice probability. However, if we can
only examine the logit case, it becomes unclear how much the results are driven by the logit
assumption.
This paper characterizes a simple model of mistakes that addresses these issues. We study
a two-stage model of mistakes. At the first stage, the decision maker chooses stochastically
from a set of menus. Each menu is a set of risky alternatives (lotteries). At the second stage,
the decision maker chooses a lottery stochastically from the menu.
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First, the dynamic and risky environment helps us distinguish a model of mistakes from
a model of taste shocks. Take the random utility model as an example. In a static setting,
the decision maker’s choice behavior is the same whether we interpret εi’s as noise or as
taste shocks. In a dynamic setting, however, when it is a model of taste shocks, the expected
utility of a menu consisting of n alternatives is often defined as the expected maximum of
ui+εi’s, E max
i∈{1,...,n}
{ui+εi}. When it is a model of mistakes, the expected utility of the menu
is often defined as the rational expectation of true utility,
∑n
i=1 ρiui, in which ρi is the choice
probability of alternative i.1 Thus, the dynamic setting enables us to focus on a model of
mistakes. Since we need to analyze the decision maker’s expected utility (not just utility)
of menus, we study choices among risky alternatives to elicit the decision maker’s expected
utility function.2
Second, our model of mistakes always generates closed-form choice probability, and nests
the logit RUMM as a special case. Clearly, this model will differ from the RUMM, but will
not conflict with the substantial amount of research based on the logit RUMM following
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995).
The primitive of our model is a stochastic choice function (SCF) ρt that describes how the
decision maker chooses at stage t. For example, ρ1({a, b}, {a, b, c}) describes the probability
of choosing menu a or b if the decision maker confronts menus a, b, c at the first stage, and
ρ2({p}, a) describes the choice probability of lottery p from menu a. We impose axioms
on the SCF. Among other axioms, one main axiom follows from the assumption that the
decision maker forms a rational expectation of her own future mistakes, and another main
axiom requires that the decision maker’s true preference (induced by the SCF) satisfies the
independence axiom from expected utility theory.
1Under the interpretation of taste shocks, the formula E max
i∈{1,...,n}
{ui + εi} can be found in Train (2009)
and Fudenberg and Strzalecki (2015). Under the interpretation of mistakes, the formula
∑n
i=1 ρiui can be
found in McKelvey and Palfrey (1998). In the former case, the decision maker enjoys the option value of
larger menus. In the latter case, the decision maker suffers from mistakenly choosing alternatives with low
true utility from larger menus.
2For these ideas to be implemented, it is sufficient to examine a two-stage model we describe above. We
generalize the model to a setting that is similar to Kreps and Porteus (1978) in the Appendix.
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The main theorem establishes that the SCF satisfies our axioms if and only if it has
the following representation: There exists an expected utility function U and a propensity
function φ such that for each lottery p, U(p) =
∑
p(x)U(x) as usual; for each menu a =
{p1, . . . , pn} and each set of menus A,
U(a) =
∑
pi∈a
ρ2({pi}, a)U(pi), (1)
ρ1({a}, A) =
φ(U(a))∑
b∈A φ(U(b))
and ρ2({pi}, a) =
φ(U(pi))∑
pj∈a φ(U(pj))
.
Equation (1) reflects the decision maker’s rational expectation of future mistakes. It com-
putes the expected true utility the decision maker gains by choosing from a. The propensity
function is a strictly increasing function that converts an alternative’s utility u into a mea-
sure of propensity for choosing that alternative, φ(u) > 0. We call this representation of an
SCF a Consistent-Mistakes Model (CMM).3
We introduce a simple measure of error-proneness—that is, the propensity for making
mistakes—for comparative static analyses. Consider two decision makers, labeled 1 and 2.
Decision maker 2 is said to be more error-prone than decision maker 1 if decision maker 2
always chooses inferior lotteries with higher probability. In a CMM, this happens if and only
if
φ′2
φ2
≤ φ
′
1
φ1
;
that is, the normalized increase rate of decision maker 1’s propensity function is greater than
that of decision maker 2’s. We take φ/φ′ as a measure of error-proneness.
Using the measure of error-proneness, we study the logit RUMM. We note that the
logit RUMM is the CMM that exhibits a constant measure of error-proneness, and show
that among CMMs, the logit RUMM is characterized by a strong stochastic version of the
independence axiom from expected utility theory. The logit RUMM may be violated, for
3A similar representation has been discussed in non-axiomatic work by Chen et al. (1997) and Hofbauer
and Sandholm (2002). A detailed discussion follows in Section 5.
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example, if the decision maker becomes more error-prone as the utilities of all available
alternatives increase. We show how the CMM can accommodate the violation without
sacrificing tractability.
We analyze the properties of models of mistakes and show that, in a CMM or RUMM,
a simple monotonicity property may be violated. In particular, the expected utility of a
menu may not be increasing in the utilities of the lotteries in the menu. This observation is
specific to neither the CMM nor the RUMM. First, whenever a model of mistakes nests the
logit RUMM as a special case, monotonicity fails. Second, we show that for a wide range of
models of mistakes, including the CMM and the RUMM, there are three simple properties
that cannot hold simultaneously.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the axioms, the representation
theorem, and the measure of error-proneness. In Section 3, we characterize the logit RUMM.
Section 4 studies some properties of models of mistakes. Section 5 discusses the related
literature.
2 A Two-Stage Model of Mistakes
There are two choice stages. At the first stage, the decision maker confronts a decision
problem, which is a set of menus. The decision maker chooses a menu from the decision
problem at the first stage. A menu is a set of lotteries. At the second stage, the decision
maker chooses a lottery from the menu to consume. Choices may be stochastic at both
stages. We sometimes call menus and lotteries alternatives.
2.1 The Choice Domain and the Primitive
Let Z be an arbitrary set of outcomes, and ∆(Z) the set of simple lotteries on Z. For
any set X, let K(X) denote the collection of nonempty finite subsets of X. Therefore, the
set of menus is M := K(∆(Z)), and the set of decision problems is D := K(M). Typical
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decision problems are denoted by A,B,C,D; typical menus by a, b, c, d; and typical lotteries
by p, q, r, s. As usual, we do not distinguish between an outcome x and a degenerate lottery
δx that assigns probability 1 to x. For any set of lotteries p1, . . . , pn,
∑n
i=1 αipi represents
the lottery whose probability of outcome x is equal to
∑n
i=1 αipi(x), in which αi ≥ 0 and∑n
i=1 αi = 1.
p q r
a = {p}
A = {a, b}
b = {q, r}
Figure 1: The decision problem is A, which consists of two menus, a and b. Menu a consists
of only one lottery p. Menu b consists of two lotteries, q and r.
The decision maker makes mistakes stochastically at both stages. The following pair of
functions is the primitive of our model that describes the decision maker’s choices.
Definition 1 A pair of functions ρ1 : D × D → [0, 1] and ρ2 :M×M → [0, 1] is called a
stochastic choice function (SCF) if for any decision problems A,B and menus a, b, ρ1(A,A) =
1, ρ2(a, a) = 1, ρ1(A,B) =
∑
c∈A ρ1({c}, B), and ρ2(a, b) =
∑
p∈a ρ2({p}, b).
When the menu is b, ρ2(a, b) represents the probability that any lottery contained in a is
chosen. Similarly, when the decision problem is B, ρ1(A,B) represents the probability that
any menu contained in A is chosen.
When we say that a decision maker makes mistakes, implicitly we mean that she has
a stable true preference. Since she is error-prone, she will not reveal the true preference
deterministically. However, she may reveal the true preference statistically. Based on an
SCF, we define the decision maker’s true preference over lotteries as follows.
Definition 2 For any p, q ∈ ∆(Z), we say that p is preferred to q (p % q) if ρ2({p}, {p} ∪
a) ≥ ρ2({q}, {q} ∪ a) for any menu a ∈M such that p, q 6∈ a.
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p q r
a
A
b
ρ2({r}, b)
ρ1({a}, A)
Figure 2: At the first stage, the decision maker chooses menu a from decision problem A
with probability ρ1({a}, A). Suppose she chooses b at the first stage. At the second stage,
she chooses lottery r from menu b with probability ρ2({r}, b).
The decision maker reveals that she prefers p to q if p is always chosen over a with higher
probability than q over a, for any a that does not contain p, q. We could have similarly
defined the decision maker’s true preference over menus, but it is unnecessary now; the true
preference over menus will become useful in Section 4. Below, we impose axioms on the SCF
(ρ1, ρ2) and sometimes on the induced true preference %.
2.2 Axioms and the Representation
We first consider three axioms that have appeared in the literature.
Axiom 1 (Positivity) For any p ∈ a ∈ M and b ∈ A ∈ D, ρ1({b}, A) > 0 and ρ2({p}, a) >
0.
Axiom 2 (Luce Independence) For any a, b, c, d ∈ M and A,B,C,D ∈ D such that (a ∪
b) ∩ (c ∪ d) = ∅ and (A ∪B) ∩ (C ∪D) = ∅,
1. ρ1(A,A ∪ C) ≥ ρ1(B,B ∪ C) implies ρ1(A,A ∪D) ≥ ρ1(B,B ∪D);
2. ρ2(a, a ∪ c) ≥ ρ2(b, b ∪ c) implies ρ2(a, a ∪ d) ≥ ρ2(b, b ∪ d).
Axiom 3 (vNM Independence) For any p, q, r ∈ ∆(Z) and α ∈ (0, 1), p  q implies αp +
(1− α)r  αq + (1− α)r.
Positivity is from McFadden (1973). In our setting, it states that every alternative
has some chance to be (mistakenly) chosen. Luce Independence is from Gul et al. (2014).
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Together with other axioms, it ensures that our representation will be a Luce rule (Luce
(1959)). One well-known violation of the Luce rule is the duplication problem (Debreu
(1960)), which violates Luce Independence. Since the main idea of our paper is unrelated
to this violation, we maintain Luce Independence. More importantly, Luce Independence
ensures that the decision maker will reveal her true preference consistently; that is, if she
chooses p over a set of lotteries a more often than q over a, then she always chooses p with
higher probability than q over any other set of lotteries that does not contain p, q.
The third axiom, vNM Independence, is needed to identify the decision maker’s expected
utility function. Note that the primitive of our model is the SCF. Therefore, although vNM
Independence appears to be identical to the independence axiom from expected utility theory,
they have different behavioral content. Also note that vNM Independence only concerns
second-stage choices. Following vNM Independence, we impose two technical assumptions
on the second-stage choices.
Axiom 4 (Continuity) For any p, q ∈ ∆(Z) and a ∈ M, ρ2({αp + (1 − α)q}, {αp + (1 −
α)q} ∪ a) is continuous in α.
Axiom 5 (Unboundedness) For any a ∈M and α ∈ (0, 1), there exist lotteries p, q 6∈ a such
that ρ2({p}, {p} ∪ a) < α and ρ2({q}, {q} ∪ a) > α.
Since we have imposed vNM Independence, it is natural to consider the continuity axiom
from expected utility theory. However, imposing the vNM continuity axiom on the decision
maker’s true preference can still allow ρ2({αp + (1 − α)q}, {αp + (1 − α)q} ∪ a) to change
discontinuously as α changes. Our Continuity axiom is a natural extension of the vNM
continuity axiom to the current setting. Unboundedness is a stochastic version of the standard
unboundedness assumption expressed using choice probability.
Our last axiom connects the decision maker’s belief about menus to lotteries. To state
it, we first define comparable lotteries. For any menu a = {p1, . . . , pn} ∈ M, we can find a
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lottery denoted by pa such that for any outcome x ∈ Z,
pa(x) =
n∑
i=1
ρ2({pi}, a)× pi(x);
that is, the probability that pa assigns to each outcome x is equal to the probability that
the decision maker gets x after (i) she chooses some pi from a and (ii) pi’s risk resolves. We
call pa the comparable lottery of menu a.
Axiom 6 (Rational Expectation of Mistakes) For a1, . . . , an ∈ M, ρ1({ai}, {a1, . . . , an}) =
ρ2({pai}, {pa1 , . . . , pan}).
If the decision maker understands the probability with which she chooses each alternative
in the menu ai, she will notice that ai and pai induce the same probability distribution over
outcomes. The only difference is that with the alternative ai, it is the decision maker’s choice
that induces the distribution over outcomes, while with pai , the decision maker does not need
to make any choice—pai itself is the distribution over outcomes. If the decision maker only
cares about what distribution over outcomes she obtains, and does not care whether the
distribution arises from her choices, then choosing between ai’s is equivalent to choosing
between pai ’s. Therefore, we require that the decision maker’s error-prone choice behavior
be identical in those two situations.
In Theorem 1, we show that these axioms are equivalent to the following representation.
Definition 3 An SCF (ρ1, ρ2) is a Consistent-Mistakes Model (CMM) if there exists a
function U : ∆(Z) ∪ M → R and a surjective strictly increasing continuous function
φ : U(∆(Z) ∪ M) → R++ such that for any p ∈ ∆(Z), a = {p1, . . . , pn} ∈ M, and
A ∈ D,
U(p) =
∑
p(x)U(x), (2)
U(a) =
n∑
i=1
ρ2({pi}, a)U(pi), (3)
9
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and
ρ1({a}, A) =
φ(U(a))∑
b∈A φ(U(b))
and ρ2({pi}, a) =
φ(U(pi))∑
pj∈a φ(U(pj))
. (4)
When U, φ satisfy the equations above, we say that (U, φ) represents ρ. A lottery’s utility
is given by equation (2), the standard expected utility equation. For a decision problem a,
equation (3) says that the decision maker forms a rational expectation about the expected
utility that she will get if she actually chooses from a. Although the decision maker seems
to understand her future choice probability, this does not imply that she can avoid mistakes.
For example, an investor may be well aware that she does not always invest optimally, but
she may understand, on average, how often she makes mistakes and how bad those mistakes
typically are. Following the tradition in economics, we assume that the decision maker’s
expectation is rational (unbiased).
The decision maker makes mistakes when choosing. The function φ, called the propensity
function, in equation (4) translates an alternative’s utility into a measure of the propensity
for choosing that alternative. Since the propensity function is the same for both stages, the
way the decision maker makes mistakes at both stages is the same. One way to interpret
equation (4) is that, for example, when confronting two alternatives, the decision maker may
know that one alternative (such as an investment opportunity) gives her expected utility
1 and the other gives 0, but she can only identify the better alternative with probability
φ(1)
φ(1)+φ(0)
. Since φ is increasing, alternatives with higher utility will be chosen more often.
The propensity function describes the decision maker’s error-proneness. For example, let
φ(u) = uk (u ∈ R++). Higher k implies fewer mistakes. In the limiting case in which k is
arbitrarily large, the best alternatives will be chosen with certainty. At the other extreme,
when φ becomes a constant function in the limit, the decision maker chooses uniformly
randomly. A formal comparative static analysis will be presented after we introduce the
main theorem.
Our first result is the representation theorem that establishes the equivalence between
the axioms and the CMM.
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Theorem 1 An SCF ρ is a CMM if and only if it satisfies Axioms 1–6. Moreover, suppose
(U, φ) represents ρ. Then,
(
U˜ , φ˜
)
also represents ρ if and only if there exist α1, α2 > 0 and
β such that U˜ = α1U + β and φ(u) = α2φ˜(α1u+ β).
The necessity is routine. The sufficiency proof consists of three steps. First, we show that
the true preference % over lotteries induced by the second-stage SCF ρ2 satisfies the three
vNM axioms. Recall that a lottery p is preferred to q if p is always chosen over a with higher
probability than q over a, for any menu a that does not contain p, q. Luce Independence
ensures that % is complete. Positivity, Luce Independence, and Unboundedness are needed
to show that the preference is transitive. Together with vNM Independence and Continuity,
we know that % has an expected utility representation; that is, we can identify an expected
utility function Uˆ defined for all lotteries. This gives us equation (2). As usual, Uˆ is unique
up to a positive affine transformation.
Next, we show that the second-stage SCF ρ2 satisfies a richness assumption used by Gul
et al. (2014) due to Positivity, Continuity, and Unboundedness. Therefore, thanks to their
Theorem 1, Luce Independence and richness imply the existence of a positive function V
that evaluates each lottery such that ρ2({pi}, {p1, . . . , pn}) = V (pi)∑n
j=1 V (pj)
. The axioms impose
several restrictions on V . The most important restriction stems from the observation that V
represents %. Specifically, Uˆ is an expected utility representation of %, while V only needs
to be a utility representation of %. Hence, V is a monotone transformation of Uˆ (but not
necessarily a positive affine transformation of Uˆ); that is, given V and Uˆ , the restriction on
V is that there is a unique strictly increasing function φ such that V (p) = φ
(
Uˆ(p)
)
for each
lottery p.
Lastly, the first-stage choices provide a revealed-preference foundation for interpreting
the decision maker’s second-stage choice randomness as mistakes. Define a function U such
that U(p) = Uˆ(p) for any lottery p, and U(a) = Uˆ(pa) for any menu a. According to
the definition of comparable lotteries, equation (3) holds because Uˆ is linear. Rational
Expectation of Mistakes pins down equations for the first-stage choices: For any decision
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problem A = {a1, . . . , am},
ρ1({ai}, A) = ρ2({pai}, {pa1 , . . . , pam}) =
φ(U(pai))∑m
j=1 φ(U(paj))
=
φ(U(ai))∑m
j=1 φ(U(aj))
.
Therefore, equation (4) holds.
To see how φ is uniquely identified from choices and how it describes error-proneness
more concretely, fix an expected utility function U that represents %. Focus on the sec-
ond stage. Consider four lotteries, p, q, r, s, such that U(p) = 0, U(q) = 1, U(r) = 100,
and U(s) = 101. Suppose we observe that the decision maker chooses q over p with prob-
ability 90% (ρ2({q}, {p, q}) = 90%), and that she chooses s over r with probability 60%
(ρ2({s}, {r, s}) = 60%). Intuitively, this reveals that the decision maker makes fewer mis-
takes when the expected utilities of all available alternatives are lower. In other words, if the
decision maker will get about 100 utils (confronting {r, s}), she is less likely to choose the
marginally better lottery, compared to the case in which she confronts {p, q}. This allows
us to pin down the rate of increase of φ for each level of expected utility.
This example also suggests that the rate of increase of φ should be related to measuring
the decision maker’s error-proneness. In the next subsection, we formalize this observation.
2.3 A Comparative Measure of Error-Proneness
Consider two decision makers, labeled I and II. We say that decision maker II is more
error-prone than decision maker I if decision maker II always chooses the inferior alternative
with higher probability. Let ρIt and ρ
II
t describe decision maker I’s and II’s stochastic choice
behavior at stage t, respectively.
Definition 4 Decision maker II is more error-prone than decision maker I if for any p, q ∈
∆(Z), ρII2 ({p}, {p, q}) ≥ ρII2 ({q}, {p, q}) implies ρI2({p}, {p, q}) ≥ ρII2 ({p}, {p, q}).
Although the decision maker also makes mistakes at the first stage, her first-stage choices
reflect how she thinks about her second-stage choices. To focus exclusively on error-proneness,
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Definition 4 only involves second-stage choices.4 The definition says that if decision maker
II is more error-prone than decision maker I, then whenever decision maker II reveals that
she prefers p over q, decision maker I not only prefers p over q as well, but also chooses the
preferred lottery p with higher probability.
Proposition 1 Suppose decision maker I’s and II’s SCFs are CMMs. Then, decision maker
II is more error-prone than decision maker I if and only if there exist (U I, φI) and (U II, φII)
representing decision maker I’s and II’s SCFs, respectively, such that U I(p) = U II(p) for any
p ∈ ∆(Z), and φII(u)
φI(u)
is decreasing in u.
Proof. Suppose U I(p) = U II(p) for any lottery p, and φ
II(u)
φI(u)
is decreasing in u. For
any lotteries p, q such that ρII2 ({p}, {p, q}) ≥ ρII2 ({q}, {p, q}), we have φ
II(U II(p))
φII(U II(p))+φII(U II(q))
≥
φII(U II(q))
φII(U II(p))+φII(U II(q))
. Therefore, U II(p) ≥ U II(q). Define uh := U I(p) = U II(p) and ul :=
U I(q) = U II(q). Since φ
II(uh)
φI(uh)
≤ φII(ul)
φI(ul)
, we have
φI(uh)
φI(uh) + φ
I(ul)
≥ φ
II(uh)
φII(uh) + φ
II(ul)
as desired.
Now, suppose we know that decision maker II is more error-prone than I. In a CMM,
ρI2({p}, {p, q}) ≥ ρI2({q}, {p, q})⇐⇒ U I(p) ≥ U I(q) and ρII2 ({p}, {p, q}) ≥ ρII2 ({q}, {p, q})⇐⇒
U II(p) ≥ U II(q). Therefore, the hypothesis ρII2 ({p}, {p, q}) ≥ ρII2 ({q}, {p, q})⇒ ρII2 ({p}, {p, q}) ≤
ρI2({p}, {p, q}) implies that
U II(p) ≥ U II(q)⇒ U I(p) ≥ U I(q). (5)
Equation (5) seems to allow the case in which U II(p) > U II(q), but U I(p) = U I(q). However,
as in Ghirardato et al. (2004), when U I and U II are affine functionals on a linear space, this
4The definition is the same as Definition 11 of pairwise-selectiveness in Fudenberg et al. (2015). Their
paper uses this condition to characterize properties of the cost function in their representation. We uses this
condition to study the propensity function. Both their cost function and our propensity function determine
how the decision maker makes mistakes.
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case can be ruled out. According to Corollary B.3 of Ghirardato et al. (2004), for some
λ > 0 and δ, U I(p) = λU II(p) + δ for any lottery p. Because of the uniqueness of the CMM,
we can without lost of generality pick the U II such that λ = 1 and δ = 0. In that case,
U I(∆(Z) ∪M) = U II(∆(Z) ∪M); that is, φI and φII share the same domain. Now, for
any lottery p, q such that U II(p) ≥ U II(q), we define uh and ul similarly. We must have
φI(uh)
φI(uh)+φ
I(ul)
≥ φII(uh)
φII(uh)+φ
II(ul)
, which implies that φ
II(uh)
φI(uh)
≤ φII(ul)
φI(ul)
. Therefore, we know that
φII(u)
φI(u)
is decreasing on the common domain of φI and φII.
To better understand this result, let us apply it to the case in which the propensity
functions are differentiable. We omit the proof of the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose that (U I, φI) and (U II, φII) represent decision maker I’s and II’s SCFs,
respectively, such that U I(p) = U II(p) for any p ∈ ∆(Z) and φI, φII are differentiable. Then,
decision maker II is more error-prone than decision maker I if and only if Dφ
I(u)
φI(u)
≥ DφII(u)
φII(u)
for all u.5
The result above says that if ρII is more error-prone than ρI, the normalized rate of
increase of the propensity function φII, Dφ
II
φII
, should be lower than that of φI. Based on this
result, it is natural to let φ(u)
Dφ(u)
> 0 be the measure of error-proneness. A decision maker
with higher φ(u)
Dφ(u)
is more error-prone.
3 The Logit Model and Stochastic vNM Invariance
Below, we establish a relation between the widely used logit RUMM and the independence
axiom from expected utility theory. The result suggests a new reason why, in addition to
the well-known duplication problem, the logit RUMM may be undesirable. To begin with,
note that previous discrete choice literature often does not distinguish a Luce rule from a
logit model. A Luce rule says that each alternative i ∈ {1, . . . , n} has a Luce value vi > 0
5To simplify notations, we use Dφγ to denote the derivative of φγ , γ = I,II. We use either Dφ or φ′ to
denote the derivative of φ when φ has no superscript.
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and is chosen with probability vi∑n
j=1 vj
. In a logit RUMM, each alternative i has true utility
ui, but the decision maker observes a noisy signal ui + εi of the true utility. The noise terms
εi’s follow some i.i.d. extreme value type I distribution. Since in an RUMM, the probability
of choosing alternative i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is Pr[ui + εi ≥ uj + εj, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}], it can be
shown that for some λ > 0, alternative i is chosen with probability exp{ui/λ}∑n
j=1 exp{uj/λ} .
6 Usually,
economists will identify vi’s from data and let ui = λ log vi.
The CMM is always a Luce rule, but it is a logit RUMM if and only if
φ(u) = eu/λ (6)
(up to a positive scalar multiplication) for some λ > 0. The CMM can separate the logit
RUMM from the Luce rule because in a CMM, ui is the expected utility of alternative i, and
λ log vi does not necessarily give us alternative i’s expected utility.
We want to understand what conditions characterize the logit special case of the CMM.
First, note that when a CMM exhibits a constant measure of error-proneness (φ/Dφ = λ),
simple calculations show that equation (6) holds; that is, the logit RUMM is the CMM with
a constant measure of error-proneness. The axiom below characterizes the CMM with a
constant measure of error-proneness.
Axiom 7 (Stochastic vNM Invariance) For any p, q, r, s ∈ ∆(Z) and α ∈ (0, 1), ρ2({αp +
(1−α)r}, {αp+(1−α)r, αp+(1−α)s}) = ρ2({αq+(1−α)r}, {αq+(1−α)r, αq+(1−α)s}).
Stochastic vNM Invariance says that when the common component p in αp + (1 − α)r
and αp + (1 − α)s is replaced with q, the propability of choosing either lottery should
not change. This axiom is related to the independence axiom in expected utility theory.
Consider a classic example from the Allais paradox. Suppose there is a continuum of ex
ante identical students. Each is asked to choose between two lotteries, s1 and s2. Lottery
s1 gives one million dollars with probability 11% and zero otherwise, and lottery s2 gives
6See Luce (1959), McFadden (1973), and Train (2009).
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five million dollars with probability 10% and zero otherwise. Say that τ percent of students
prefer s2 over s1. Next, each student is asked to choose between another two lotteries, r1
and r2. Lottery r1 gives one million dollars with certainty, and lottery r2 gives zero dollars
with probability 1%, one million dollars with probability 89%, and five million dollars with
probability 10%. Say that τ ′ percent of students prefer r2 over r1. Clearly, τ may be different
from τ ′.
However, Stochastic vNM Invariance requires that τ = τ ′. To see this, first note that
because the students are ex ante identical, if (ρ1, ρ2) is an arbitrary student’s SCF, then
ρ2({s2}, {s1, s2}) = τ and ρ2({r2}, {r1, r2}) = τ ′. Next, from the relation between s1, s2, r1, r2
illustrated in the table below, we can see that Stochastic vNM Invariance implies τ = τ ′.
r1 = 11%× p+ 89%× r r2 = 11%× q + 89%× r
$1M
89% $1M
1% $0
10% $5M
s1 = 11%× p+ 89%× s s2 = 11%× q + 89%× s
89% $0
11% $1M
90% $0
10% $5M
In the table, p and r both give one million dollars with certainty, s gives zero dollars with
certainty, and q gives five million dollars with probability 10/11 and zero dollars with prob-
ability 1/11.
From the table we can also see that if every student’s preference over lotteries satisfies
the independence axiom in expected utility theory, then a student chooses s2 over s1 if and
only if she chooses r2 over r1. This implies τ = τ
′. Thus, the violation of Stochastic vNM
Invariance is related to the violation of the independence axiom in expected utility theory.
A CMM does not have to satisfy Stochastic vNM Invariance, but it must satisfy vNM
Independence, which is also related to the independence axiom in expected utility theory.
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Does the violation of the independence axiom in expected utility theory above suggest that
vNM Independence is often violated as well? Not necessarily. In the example above, it
can be verified that as long as both τ and τ ′ are above 1/2, or both are below 1/2, vNM
Independence is not violated. Indeed, in 2015 and 2016, we asked students from a PhD-level
microeconomics course at the University of Michigan to choose from {s1, s2} and then from
{r1, r2}. In both years, the total number of students was around 50, with τ around 45 and
τ ′ around 35. We do not find evidence that vNM Independence is violated.
The following result establishes the relation between the logit RUMM and Stochastic
vNM Invariance.
Proposition 2 Suppose an SCF is a CMM such that U(∆(Z)) = R. The SCF is a CMM
with a constant measure of error-proneness if and only if it satisfies Stochastic vNM Invari-
ance.
Suppose the decision maker’s SCF is a CMM. The fact that Stochastic vNM Invariance
is almost always violated means that the decision maker usually does not have a constant
measure of error-proneness. One plausible alternative assumption is that Dφ(u)
φ(u)
may be higher
at lower u, but lower at higher u; that is, the decision maker is more error-prone when the
utilities of all available alternatives are higher. The RUMM may be able to accommodate
this, but it is likely intractable. The CMM can easily accommodate this without sacrificing
tractability. For instance, suppose φ(u) = uλ (u ≥ 0). Then,
φ(u)
Dφ(u)
=
u
λ
;
that is, the measure of error-proneness increases with u.
Let us point out another way to characterize the logit RUMM. In the previous literature,
the CMM briefly appears in Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002).7 In a somewhat different setting,
they show that the logit model is the only intersection between the random utility model and
7We thank an anonymous referee for referring us to this result.
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the CMM. Below, we adapt their finding to our setting to provide another characterization
of the logit RUMM.
Proposition 3 Suppose an SCF (ρ1, ρ2) is a CMM such that U(∆(Z)) = R. The following
statements are equivalent:
1. For some strictly positive density function f : R → R++, ρ2({pi}, {p1, . . . , pn}) =
Pr[U(pi) + εi ≥ U(pj) + εj,∀j] for any p1, . . . , pn ∈ ∆(Z), in which εj’s are i.i.d.
random variables whose density function is f ;
2. The SCF is a CMM with a constant measure of error-proneness.
Proof. The second statement implies the first, because we can let εj’s be i.i.d. according to
some extreme value type I distribution (McFadden (1973)), whose density function is strictly
positive. To see why part 1 implies part 2, first note that since U(∆(Z)) = R, Lemma 4 in
the Appendix shows that for each u ∈ R, there are infinitely many lotteries whose expected
utility is equal to u. Thus, for each integer n and each vector (u1, . . . , un) ∈ Rn, we can find
a set of distinct lotteries p1, . . . , pn such that U(pj) = uj for j = 1, . . . , n. Next, since εj’s are
i.i.d. and the first statement holds, for each integer n, we apply Hofbauer and Sandholm’s
(2002) Proposition 2.3 to show that the only way for ρ2 to satisfy ρ2({pi}, {p1, . . . , pn}) =
φ(U(pi))∑
pj∈a φ(U(pj))
for any n lotteries p1, . . . , pn is to have φ(u) = e
u/λ for some positive λ (up to
a positive scalar multiplication). Since this conclusion does not depend on n, we know that
the CMM has to have a constant measure of error-proneness.
4 Risk from Mistakes vs. Standard Objective Risk
Two types of risks appear in our framework. The risk associated with lotteries is the standard
objective risk. The other, risk from mistakes, is due to the decision maker’s stochastic error-
prone choices. Decision makers’ choice mistakes have caused big losses for banks and other
financial institutions in the past. Economists have classified this type of risk as an important
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case of operational risk in one of the most influential banking regulations, Basel II. In this
section, we analyze risk from mistakes and discuss how it differs from standard risk.
We start with a counterintuitive observation: The expected utility that a decision maker
gets from a menu may not be increasing in the utilities of its lotteries. In Definition 2, we
only define the decision maker’s true preference over lotteries. Now, let us similarly define
the decision maker’s true preference over menus: For any a, b ∈M, we say that a is preferred
to b (a % b) if
ρ1({a}, {a} ∪ A) ≥ ρ1({b}, {b} ∪ A)
for any decision problem A ∈ D such that a, b 6∈ A.
Let us introduce a simple property of the SCF.
Definition 5 An SCF is weakly monotone if p1 % q1 and p2 % q2 imply {p1, p2} % {q1, q2}.
Note that an adapted version of weak monotonicity holds for standard risk under expected
utility theory: If p1 % q1 and p2 % q2, then αp1 + (1− α)p2 % αq1 + (1− α)q2.
Surprisingly, the logit RUMM violates weak monotonicity, which means that weak mono-
tonicity will be violated for any class of models of mistakes that nests the widely used logit
RUMM as a special case. To see why weak monotonicity is violated, consider a menu con-
sisting of two lotteries, {p, qn}. Say the utility of lottery p is 2, and the utility of qn is −n
(n ≥ 0). If we replace p with r, whose utility is equal to 2.1, and replace qn with s, whose
utility is 1, we seem to have obtained a better menu, {r, s}. However, think of the logit
RUMM with φ(u) = eu. As n gets arbitrarily large,
lim
n→−∞
U({p, qn}) = 2,
because U({p, qn}) = ρ2({p}, {p, qn}) × 2 + ρ2({qn}, {p, qn}) × (−n), and it can be verified
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that lim
n→−∞
− n× ρ2({qn}, {p, qn}) = 0. In contrast,
U({r, s}) = exp{1}+ 2.1 exp{2.1}
exp{1}+ exp{2.1} ≈ 1.825 < 2.
Therefore, for n large enough, {p, qn}  {r, s}, even though r  p and s  qn.
The intuition is as follows. In a model of mistakes, having strictly better lotteries in
a menu does not necessarily improve the menu, because the choice probability distribution
depends on the lotteries. By having the obviously worse lottery qn instead of s, it is easier
for the decision maker to avoid the worse lottery.
Such a violation of weak monotonicity is not limited to this particular logit RUMM with
φ(u) = eu. It is easy to prove that all logit RUMMs violate weak monotonicity, because
when φ(u) = eu/λ, lim
u→−∞
uφ(u) = 0. Many other CMMs and RUMMs also violate weak
monotonicity. The following result says that in the CMM, some limiting behavior of φ can
tell us whether weak monotonicity is violated.
Proposition 4 Suppose an SCF is a CMM such that U(∆(Z)) = R. If lim
u→−∞
uφ(u) = 0,
then ρ is not weakly monotone.
This is not a coincidence. Some properties are natural in the context of standard risk, but
conflict in the context of risk from mistakes. To illustrate this, we present below a general
impossibility result. The proposition above will become a corollary of it.
4.1 An Impossibility Theorem
To show this result, we need only to work with the decision maker’s true utility function
U : ∆(Z)∪M→ R. We do not require U to be an expected utility function, nor do we need
to specify how the decision maker’s SCF depends on U . Therefore, the result below applies
to a wide range of models, including the CMM and RUMM. We say that U is monotone if
U(p1) > U(q1), U(p2) ≥ U(q2)⇒ U({p1, p2}) > U({q1, q2}).
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It should be clear by now why monotonicity may seem reasonable and why it may not. We
say that U satisfies betweenness if
U(p) ≥ U(q)⇒ U(p) ≥ U({p, q}) ≥ U(q).
The idea is that even though the decision maker makes mistakes, she understands that the
true utility she gets by choosing from a menu will be between the best lottery’s utility and
the worst lottery’s utility. Clearly, both the CMM and RUMM satisfy betweenness. We say
that U satisfies reducibility if
lim
n→∞
U(qn) = −∞⇒ lim
n→∞
U({p, qn}) = U(p).
Reducibility means that as qn gets arbitrarily bad, it become more and more obvious for the
decision maker to not choose qn. Since qn will not be chosen in the limit, it can be ignored
in the limit from the menu {p, qn}; that is, p is as good as {p, qn} in the limit. Although this
property may seem less appealing, it is nonetheless satisfied by the logit RUMM.
We can write down a version of monotonicity, betweenness, and reducibility for standard
risk and expected utility theory, which can hold simultaneously.8 In contrast, the result
below shows that there is some tension between these three simple properties.
Theorem 2 Suppose U(∆(Z)) = R, and for each u ∈ R, there exist two distinct lotteries
p, q such that U(p) = U(q) = u. Monotonicity, betweenness, and reducibility cannot hold
simultaneously.
The proof of this result is simple. Suppose there is a U such that all three conditions hold.
Take two different lotteries p and q0 such that U(p) = U(q0) = u. By betweenness, we know
that U({p, q0}) = u. Find a sequence {qn} such that U(qn+1) < U(qn) and limn→∞ U(qn) =
8A lottery version of monotonicity is as follows: If p1 % q1 and p2 % q2, then αp1 + (1 − α)p2 %
αq1 + (1 − α)q2. A lottery version of betweenness is as follows: If p % q, then p % αp + (1 − α)q % q. A
lottery version of reducibility is as follows: limα→1 αp+ (1− α)q ∼ p.
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−∞. Then, by monotonicity and reducibility, we know that
u > U({p, qn}) > lim
n→∞
U({p, qn}) = u.
Therefore, we reach a contradiction.
5 Related Literature
The most popular stochastic choice model is the random utility model (Thurstone (1927)
and Block and Marschak (1960)). Motivated by the fact that the random utility model is
usually intractable, we provide a decision theoretic foundation for an alternative model, the
CMM, which is tractable. Similar to what Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002) have observed,
we confirm that under certain assumptions, the only intersection between the random utility
model and the CMM is the logit model.
Chen et al. (1997) first study the CMM. They examine an equilibrium notion in which
players’ behavior follows equations that are similar to the CMM. We focus on other aspects
of the CMM. We characterize the CMM axiomatically, which shows how it can be uniquely
identified or falsified using individual choice data. We analyze its comparative measure of
error-proneness, the logit special case, and other behavioral properties.
A CMM is a Luce rule (Luce (1959)). In the previous literature, we often do not dis-
tinguish between the Luce rule and the logit model (either of mistakes or of taste shocks).
However, in our setting, the logit RUMM is a special case of the CMM. This is because by
analyzing the decision maker’s choices over lotteries, we identify the expected utility function
separately. A similar argument about why the Luce rule and the logit model are different
also appears in Chen et al. (1997) and Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002), but in both papers,
utilities are given. We explain how to identify the true expected utility function from error-
prone choices. We show that a strong stochastic version of the independence axiom from
expected utility theory characterizes the logit model, and that the logit model has a constant
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measure of error-proneness.
In a recent critique, Apesteguia and Ballester (2016) show that the random utility model
violates some monotonicity property: Confronting two lotteries, the choice probability of
the riskier lottery may increase as the decision maker becomes more risk-averse. Their
monotonicity property is different from ours in Section 4. The CMM also violates their
monotonicity property.
Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) also study stochastic choices in a setting with risky alterna-
tives. They introduce a linearity condition that requires
ρ2({pi}, {p1, . . . , pn}) = ρ2({αpi + (1− α)q}, {αp1 + (1− α)q, . . . , αpn + (1− α)q}), (7)
for any lotteries p1, . . . , pn, q and α ∈ (0, 1). This condition is stronger than Stochastic vNM
Invariance in two ways. First, Stochastic vNM Invariance only considers binary choices.
Second, for binary choices, what Stochastic vNM Invariance requires is implied by equation
(7).
Our paper is related to several papers on dynamic stochastic choices, such as Gul et al.
(2014), Fudenberg and Strzalecki (2015), and Fudenberg et al. (2015). Gul et al. introduce
a model to address the duplication problem (Debreu (1960)). In a dynamic setting, their
decision maker can detect and delete duplicates in dynamic problems. Our Luce Indepen-
dence axiom is adapted from Gul et al. They use a richness assumption to establish the
equivalence between their version of Luce Independence and the Luce rule. In our paper,
with lotteries, the richness assumption is replaced with Continuity and Unboundedness. We
use their Theorem 1 to show that under our axioms, the SCF is a Luce rule.
Fudenberg and Strzalecki (2015) are the first to use an axiomatic approach to extend
the logit model to a dynamic setting. The dynamic setting they consider has finitely many
stages and flow payoffs.9 They establish the relation between aversion to bigger menus and
preference for postponing making choices. They offer two equivalent representations of the
9We extend the CMM to a similar dynamic setting in the Appendix.
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SCF. In the first, choice randomness comes from taste shocks. The utility of a menu is equal
to Emax{ui + εi} minus some cost of making choices, which captures the aversion to bigger
menus. In the second representation, the stochastic choice results from maximizing a menu’s
expected true utility (similar to our equation (3)) minus an adjusted entropy cost function.
Similar to the second representation but in a static setting, Fudenberg et al. (2015) propose a
model whose cost function is not necessarily adjusted entropy, and the SCF is not necessarily
logistic. Cost functions are ruled out in our paper.
Other papers have studied dynamic deterministic choices. Krishna and Sadowski (2014)
study the decision maker’s preference over state-contingent infinite-horizon decision prob-
lems; the states represent taste shocks and follow a subjective Markov process. Cooke (2017)
and Piermont et al. (2016) study how from dynamic choices, one can reveal the taste-related
information that the decision maker has learned through past consumption. In both papers,
learning is endogenous.
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A Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: We first prove the necessity of the axioms. A CMM is a Luce
rule according to (4). Hence, according to Gul et al. (2014), ρ1 satisfies the first part of
Luce Independence, and ρ2 satisfies the second part. In a Luce rule, p % q if and only
if φ(U(p)) ≥ φ(U(q)). Since φ is strictly increasing, we know that p % q if and only if
U(p) ≥ U(q). When restricted to ∆(Z), U is an expected utility function. Therefore, vNM
Independence holds. According to equations (3) and (4), Rational Expectation of Mistakes
holds.
Since φ(U(p)), φ(U(a)) > 0 for any lottery p and menu a, Positivity holds. Note that
U(∆(Z)) = U(∆(Z) ∪M), because for any a = {p1, . . . , pn} ∈ M, U(a) is some weighted
average of U(pi)’s. Since φ is surjective, φ(U(Z)) = R++. Therefore, Unboundedness holds.
Lastly, because for any p, q ∈ ∆(Z), U(αp+ (1−α)q) and U({αp+ (1−α)q}) are equal and
continuous in α, and φ is continuous, one can verify that Continuity holds.
Next, we prove the sufficiency of the axioms.
Lemma 1 The preference % is complete and transitive.
Proof. From Luce Independence, we know that% is complete because for any ρ2({p}, {p}∪a)
and ρ2({q}, {q} ∪ a) such that p, q 6∈ a, the former is either greater than or less than the
latter. Say it is greater. Luce Independence implies that ρ2({p}, {p} ∪ b) ≥ ρ2({q}, {q} ∪ b)
for any b ∈M such that p, q 6∈ b. Therefore, p % q.
To prove transitivity, suppose ρ2({p}, {p} ∪ a) ≥ ρ2({q}, {q} ∪ a) and ρ2({q}, {q} ∪ b) ≥
ρ2({r}, {r} ∪ b), in which p, q, r ∈ ∆(Z), p, q 6∈ a, and q, r 6∈ b. If any two of p, q, r are
identical, clearly we have p % r. Otherwise, we can apply Luce Independence to know that
ρ2({p}, {p} ∪ a) ≥ ρ2({q}, {q} ∪ a) implies
ρ2({p}, {p, r}) ≥ ρ2({q}, {q, r}), (8)
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and ρ2({q}, {q} ∪ b) ≥ ρ2({r}, {r} ∪ b) implies
ρ2({q}, {p, q}) ≥ ρ2({r}, {p, r}). (9)
Due to Positivity, ρ2({r}, {p, r}) > 0. By Unboundedness, we can find a new lottery s ∈ ∆(Z)
such that
ρ2({s}, {p, s}) < ρ2({r}, {p, r}). (10)
Equations (8), (9), and (10) show that s is distinct from p, q, r. By Luce Independence, we
have ρ2({p}, {p, s}) ≥ ρ2({q}, {q, s}) ≥ ρ2({r}, {r, s}). Therefore, p % r.
Lemma 2 For any p, q, r ∈ ∆(Z), p  q  r implies that there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that
αp+ (1− α)r  q  βp+ (1− β)r.
Proof. Following similar arguments from the previous lemma, we can find a lottery s
such that ρ2({p}, {p, s}) > ρ2({q}, {q, s}) > ρ2({r}, {r, s}), in which s 6= p, q, r. Note that
p = 1 · p+ 0 · r. By Continuity, we can find an α near 1 such that ρ2({αp+ (1−α)r}, {αp+
(1 − α)r, s}) > ρ2({q}, {q, s}), if αp + (1 − α)r is distinct from s. If the α we pick satisfies
αp+ (1− α)r = s, we can find another α′ 6= α near 1 such that ρ2({α′p+ (1− α′)r}, {α′p+
(1− α′)r, s}) > ρ2({q}, {q, s}), in which case α′p + (1− α′)r has to be different from s. To
find β, similar arguments apply.
The lemma above shows that the familiar vNM continuity axiom is satisfied by the
preference %. Knowing that % is complete and transitive, and satisfies vNM Independence
and the vNM continuity axiom, we know that there exists a function Uˆ : ∆(Z) → R that
represents % such that
Uˆ(p) =
∑
x∈Z
p(x)Uˆ(x). (11)
By writing Uˆ(x) in equation (11), we mean Uˆ(δx), as we do not distinguish between δx and
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x. Define a function U : ∆(Z) ∪M→ R such that for any a = {p1, . . . , pm} ∈ M,
U(a) := Uˆ(pa),
and for any p ∈ ∆(Z), U(p) := Uˆ(p). We immediately have equation (2). By construction,
U(a) = Uˆ(pa) =
∑
x∈Z
(
m∑
i=1
ρ2({pi}, a)pi(x)Uˆ(x)
)
(12)
=
m∑
i=1
ρ2({pi}, a)Uˆ(pi). (13)
Hence, equation (3) holds.
Finally, we show that equation (4) holds and φ’s properties, as stated in Definition 3, are
satisfied.
Lemma 3 For any a ∈ M and α ∈ (0, 1), we can find p, q, r ∈ ∆(Z) such that p, q, r 6∈ a,
ρ2({p}, {p} ∪ a) = α, ρ2({q}, {q} ∪ a) > α, ρ2({r}, {r} ∪ a) < α, and p = βq + (1− β)r for
some β ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. By Unboundedness, there exists q(0) 6∈ a and r(0) 6∈ a such that ρ2({q(0)}, {q(0)}∪a) >
α and ρ2({r(0)}, {r(0)} ∪ a) < α. By Continuity and the Intermediate Value Theorem, we
can find β(0) such that
ρ2({β(0)q(0) + (1− β(0))r(0)}, {β(0)q(0) + (1− β(0))r(0)} ∪ a) = α,
if β(0)q(0) + (1− β(0))r(0) 6∈ a.
Suppose β(0)q(0) + (1 − β(0))r(0) ∈ a. We can apply Unboundedness to find q(1) 6∈ a and
r(1) 6∈ a such that 1 > ρ2
({
q(1)
}
,
{
q(1)
} ∪ a) > ρ2({q}, {q}∪a) and 0 < ρ2 ({r(1)} ,{r(1)} ∪ a) <
ρ2({r1}, {r1} ∪ a). We know that 1 > ρ2
({
q(1)
}
,
{
q(1)
} ∪ a) and 0 < ρ2 ({r(1)} ,{r(1)} ∪ a)
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because of Positivity. Again, we can find β(1) such that
ρ2
({
β(1)q(1) +
(
1− β(1)
)
r(1)
}
,
{
β(1)q(1) +
(
1− β(1)
)
r(1)
}
∪ a
)
= α,
if β(1)q(1) +
(
1− β(1)
)
r(1) 6∈ a.
Suppose β(1)q(1) +
(
1− β(1)
)
r(1) ∈ a again. We can repeat the above procedure. Since
a is finite, after at most (|a| + 1) rounds, we will be able to find lotteries q(i), r(i), β(i)q(i) +(
1− β(i)
)
r(i) 6∈ a such that ρ2({q(i)}, {q(i)} ∪ a) > α, ρ2({r(i)}, {r(i)} ∪ a) < α, and
ρ2
({
β(i)q(i) +
(
1− β(i)
)
r(i)
}
,
{
β(i)q(i) +
(
1− β(i)
)
r(i)
}
∪ a
)
= α for some integer i ≤ |a|.
Let q := q(i), r := r(i), and p := β(i)q(i) +
(
1− β(i)
)
r(i).
Lemma 4 For any a ∈ M, α ∈ (0, 1), and u ∈ U(∆(Z) ∪M), there exists infinitely many
p ∈ ∆(Z) such that ρ2({p}, {p}∪a) = α, and infinitely many p′ ∈ ∆(Z) such that U(p′) = u.
Proof. By Unboundedness, according to Lemma 3, there exist q1, r1, p1 6∈ a such that
p1 = β1q1+(1−β1)r1, ρ2({q1}, {q1}∪a) > α, ρ2({r1}, {r1}∪a) < α, and ρ2({p1}, {p1}∪a) = α.
Consider supp(q1) and supp(r1). Since they are finite, we can find x ∈supp(q1)∪supp(r1)
such that x % z for all z ∈supp(q1)∪supp(r1), and y ∈supp(q1)∪supp(r1) such that z % y
for all z ∈supp(q1)∪supp(r1). Applying Unboundedness again, we can find a lottery q2 6∈ a
such that 1 > ρ2({q2}, {q2} ∪ a) > ρ2({x}, {x} ∪ a). We must have 1 > ρ2({q2}, {q2} ∪ a)
because of Positivity. We do not need to worry about x ∈ a, because if that is the case, we
can always apply Lemma 3 to find some other lottery s such that s ∼ x and s 6∈ a. The
same arguments go through if we replace x with s. Without loss of generality, let us assume
that x 6∈ a for simplicity.
We claim that supp(q2) must contain some outcome that is strictly better than x, and
hence supp(q2) 6=supp(q1),supp(r1). If this claim is not true, then x % q2, because %
has a standard expected utility representation over ∆(Z). However, x % q2 implies that
ρ2({x}, {x} ∪ a) ≥ ρ2({q2}, {q2} ∪ a) for any a such that x, q2 6∈ a, which is a contradiction.
Similarly, we can find r2 6∈ a such that 0 < ρ2({r2}, {r2} ∪ a) < ρ2({y}, {y} ∪ a), and hence
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supp(r2) 6=supp(q1),supp(r1). Again, we have assumed without loss of generality that y 6∈ a.
By Continuity, we can find β2 ∈ (0, 1) such that ρ2({p2}, {p2}∪a) = α, in which p2 := β2q2+
(1−β2)r2 6∈ a. Clearly, p2 is distinct from p1, q1, r1 since both q2 and r2 have different supports
from q1 and r1. Again, we do not have to worry that β2q2+(1−β2)r2 ∈ a; otherwise, we could
use the same procedure in Lemma 3 to find some other q
(i)
2 , r
(i)
2 , p
(i)
2 such that they are all
different from q1, r1, p1 and satisfy ρ2
({
q
(i)
2
}
,
{
q
(i)
2
}
∪ a
)
> α, ρ2
({
r
(i)
2
}
,
{
r
(i)
2
}
∪ a
)
< α,
and ρ2
({
β
(i)
2 q
(i)
2 +
(
1− β(i)2
)
r
(i)
2
}
,
{
β
(i)
2 q
(i)
2 +
(
1− β(i)2
)
r
(i)
2
}
∪ a
)
= α for some integer
i ≤ |a| and β(i)2 ∈ (0, 1).
We can repeat the above procedure to find a sequence of pj, qj, rj, j = 1, 2, . . . . Each
qj and rj will invite new elements to the support, and hence generate countably infinitely
many distinct pj 6∈ a such that ρ2({pj}, {pj} ∪ a) = α.
Lastly, for each u ∈ U(∆(Z)∪M), we can also find infinitely many p′ ∈ ∆(Z) such that
U(p′) = u. First, since U(a) is a weighted average of U(pi)’s for any menu a = {p1, . . . , pn},
we know that U(∆(Z)∪M) = U(∆(Z)). For any u ∈ U(∆(Z)∪M), there is some p′ ∈ ∆(Z)
such that U(p′) = u. From the proof above, we know that there are infinitely many lotteries.
Take a set of lotteries b such that p′ 6∈ b. Then, we already know that we can find a sequence
of lotteries, p′1, p
′
2, . . . , such that for any j ∈ N, p′j 6∈ b and
ρ2({p′j}, {p′j} ∪ b) = ρ2({p′}, {p′} ∪ b). (14)
Equation (14) and Luce Independence imply that p′j ∼ p′ for each j ∈ N. Because when
restricted to ∆(Z), U represents %, we know that U(p′j) = u.
Due to Lemma 4 and Luce Independence, we can apply Theorem 1 of Gul et al. (2014) to
ρ2. Then, we know that there exists a surjective function V : ∆(Z)→ R++ such that p % q
if and only if V (p) ≥ V (q), and for any a = {p1, . . . , pn},
ρ2({pi}, a) =
V (pi)∑n
j=1 V (pj)
.
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To see why we can do this, first note that applying the independence condition from Gul
et al. (2014) to ρ2 is identical to assuming the second part of Luce Independence. Second,
applying their richness condition to ρ2 requires that for any a, c ∈ M and α ∈ (0, 1), there
exists a menu b ∈ M such that b ∩ c = ∅ and ρ2(b, a ∪ b) = α. Lemma 4 shows for any
a, c ∈M and α ∈ (0, 1), we can find a lottery p such that ρ2({p}, {p}∪a) = α. We only have
to show that {p} ∩ c = ∅ before we let b = {p}. Since c ∈ M is a finite set of lotteries, and
there are infinitely many lotteries p that satisfy ρ2({p}, {p}∪a) = α, we can assume without
loss of generality that {p} ∩ c = ∅. Therefore, we know that ρ2 satisfies both conditions in
Gul et al.’s (2014) Theorem 1.
Since both U and V represent % on ∆(Z), we know that there exists a strictly increasing
function φ : U(L)→ R++ such that V (p) = φ(U(p)) for any p ∈ ∆(Z). Since V is surjective,
φ must also be surjective. By Continuity, φ must be continuous.
Lastly, we want to prove that for each decision problem A = {a1, . . . , am} ∈ D,
ρ1({ai}, A) =
φ(U(ai))∑m
j=1 φ(U(aj))
.
By equation (12), U(aj) = U(paj) for j = 1, . . . ,m. By Rational Expectation of Mistakes,
ρ1({ai}, A) = ρ2({pai}, {pa1 , . . . , pam})
=
φ(U(pai))∑m
j=1 φ(U(paj))
=
φ(U(ai))∑m
j=1 φ(U(aj))
.
For uniqueness, we only prove the necessity. Suppose (U, φ) represents ρ. If
(
U˜ , φ˜
)
also represents ρ, then U and U˜ both represent %. Since U and U˜ are both expected utility
functions on ∆(Z), we know that there exists α1 > 0, β ∈ R such that U˜(p) = α1U(p)+β for
any p ∈ ∆(Z). For any a ∈M, U(a) = U(pa) and U˜(a) = U˜(pa) = α1U(pa)+β = α1U(a)+β.
Therefore, U˜ = α1U + β holds for ∆(Z)∪M. Since Luce values are unique up to a positive
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scalar multiplication, φ(U(p)) = α2φ˜(U˜(p)) for some α2 > 0. Therefore, φ(u) = α2φ˜(α1u+β).

Proof of Proposition 2: We first prove the necessity. Suppose (ρ1, ρ2) is a CMM
such that U(∆(Z)) = R and φ(u) = βeu/λ (λ > 0, β > 0). Then,
ρ2({αp+ (1− α)r}, {αp+ (1− α)r, αp+ (1− α)s})
=
exp {α/λ · U(p) + (1− α)/λ · U(r)}
exp {α/λ · U(p) + (1− α)/λ · U(r)}+ exp {α/λ · U(p) + (1− α)/λ · U(s)}
=
exp {(1− α)/λ · U(r)}
exp {(1− α)/λ · U(r)}+ exp {(1− α)/λ · U(s)}
=
exp {α/λ · U(q) + (1− α)/λ · U(r)}
exp {α/λ · U(q) + (1− α)/λ · U(r)}+ exp {α/λ · U(q) + (1− α)/λ · U(s)}
= ρ2({αq + (1− α)r}, {αq + (1− α)r, αq + (1− α)s}).
Therefore, Stochastic vNM Invariance holds.
Conversely, if Stochastic vNM Invariance holds, we know that ρ2({12p+ 12r}, {12p+ 12r, 12p+
1
2
s}) = ρ2({12q + 12r}, {12q + 12r, 12q + 12s}), which means
φ(1/2 · U(p) + 1/2 · U(r))
φ(1/2 · U(p) + 1/2 · U(r)) + φ(1/2 · U(p) + 1/2 · U(s))
=
φ(1/2 · U(q) + 1/2 · U(r))
φ(1/2 · U(q) + 1/2 · U(r)) + φ(1/2 · U(q) + 1/2 · U(s)) .
Since we are focusing on ρ2, in which case φ’s domain is R, for any u1, u2,∆u ∈ R, we can
find r, s ∈ ∆(Z) such that U(r) = 2u1, U(s) = 2u2, and p, q ∈ ∆(Z) such that U(p) =
0, U(q) = 2∆u. Then, for all u1, u2,∆u ∈ R,
φ(u1)
φ(u2)
=
φ(u1 + ∆u)
φ(u2 + ∆u)
. (15)
Fixing u1, equation (15) implies that φ(u2 + ∆u) = ϕu1(u2)ηu1(∆u), in which ϕu1(u2) =
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φ(u2)/φ(u1), ηu1(∆u) = φ(u1 + ∆u). Since φ is strictly increasing, positive and continuous,
by Theorem 2 in Chapter 3 in Acze´l (1966), φ(u) = β exp{αu} for some α, β > 0. Let
λ = 1/α.

A.1 The CMM in a Dynamic Setting
Now, we move to a more general dynamic setting similar to that of Kreps and Porteus (1978).
We characterize the CMM in the new setting; notations adopted here will be different from
other parts of the paper. There is a finite integer T , and for each time t ∈ {0, . . . , T}, there
is a set Zt of possible payoffs. Generic elements of Zt are denoted by xt, yt, zt. Let LT be
the set of simple lotteries on ZT . Recursively, let Mt be the collection of nonempty finite
subsets of Lt, and let Lt−1 be the set of simple lotteries on Zt−1×Mt. Generic elements of Lt
are denoted by pt, qt, rt, and generic elements ofMt by At, Bt, Ct, Dt. We do not distinguish
between a pair of consumption and a next-stage decision problem (xt, At+1) and a degenerate
lottery δ(xt,At+1) that assigns probability 1 to the pair (xt, At+1). Mixtures of lotteries are
defined as usual. For notational convenience, we sometimes write pt+1, Lt+1, At+1,Mt+1 even
when t = T . One could treat LT+1 and MT+1 as empty sets.
A decision problem at time t is an element ofMt. An alternative at time t is an element
of Lt. We define H1 := Z0, and for each t ∈ {2, . . . , T}, Ht := Ht−1 × Zt−1. A generic
element of Ht denoted by ht = (x0, . . . , xt−1) is called a payoff histories ht at time t. For
simplicity, we write ht+1 = (x0, . . . , xt) as (ht, xt) if ht = (x0, . . . , xt−1).
At each time t, the decision maker confronting a decision problem At chooses an alter-
native pt ∈ At. The alternative pt is a probability distribution over pairs of current-stage
consumption and a next-stage decision problem. Suppose the pair (xt, At+1) ∈supp(pt) is
realized. The decision maker consumes xt and then makes another choice from At+1 at the
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next stage. Specifically, the following function describes how, after each payoff history ht,
the decision maker chooses at time t.
Definition 6 A function ρht :Mt×Mt → [0, 1] is the decision maker’s SCF at time t after
the payoff history ht if ρht(At, At) = 1 and ρht(At, Bt) =
∑
pt∈At ρht({pt}, Bt).
We call the set of functions
% :=
ρht : ρht is the decision maker’s SCF at time t after the payoffhistory ht for some t ∈ {0, . . . , T} and ht ∈ Ht

the decision maker’s SCF. From the SCF, we define the decision maker’s true preference over
alternatives at time t after the payoff history ht.
Definition 7 For any pt, qt ∈ Lt, we say that pt is preferred to qt (pt %ht qt) at time t after
the payoff history ht if ρht({pt}, {pt} ∪At) ≥ ρht({qt}, {qt} ∪At) for any At ∈Mt such that
pt, qt 6∈ At.
The axioms below are adapted from Section 2.2.
Axiom 8 (Positivity∗) At any time t after any ht, for any pt ∈ At ∈Mt, ρht({pt}, At) > 0.
Axiom 9 (Luce Independence∗) At any time t after any ht, for any At, Bt, Ct, Dt ∈Mt such
that (At ∪Bt)∩ (Ct ∪Dt) = ∅, ρht(At, At ∪Ct) ≥ ρht(Bt, Bt ∪Ct) implies ρht(At, At ∪Dt) ≥
ρht(Bt, Bt ∪Dt).
Axiom 10 (vNM Independence∗) At any time t after any ht, for any pt, qt, rt ∈ Lt and
α ∈ (0, 1), pt ht qt implies αpt + (1− α)rt ht αqt + (1− α)rt.
Axiom 11 (Continuity∗) At any time t after any ht, for any pt, qt ∈ Lt and At ∈ Mt,
ρht({αpt + (1− α)qt}, {αpt + (1− α)qt} ∪ At) is continuous in α.
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Axiom 12 (Unboundedness∗) At any time t after any ht, for any At ∈ Mt and α ∈ (0, 1),
there exist pt, qt 6∈ At such that ρht({pt}, {pt} ∪ At) < α and ρht({qt}, {qt} ∪ At) > α.
For any decision problem At =
{
p
(1)
t , . . . , p
(n)
t
}
at time t after the payoff history ht, we
define its comparable lottery piht(At) ∈ Lt as follows:
piht(At)(xt, At+1) =
n∑
i=1
ρht
({
p
(i)
t
}
, At
)
× p(i)t (xt, At+1).
The idea of the axiom below is similar to Rational Expectation of Mistakes : The decision
maker has a correct belief about the probability that she will end up with any (xt, At+1)
after choosing from At. Since piht(At) generates the same distribution over (xt, At+1)’s, the
decision maker should “identify” At with the degenerate decision problem {piht(At)}.
At
(xt, At+1)
(yt, Bt+1)
{piht(At)}
(xt, At+1)
(yt, Bt+1)
Figure 3: Solid lines represent available alternatives in a decision problem. Dotted lines
represent objective probabilities from lotteries. The probability of choosing (xt, At+1) from
At is equal to the probability that the alternative piht(At) assigns to (xt, At+1).
Axiom 13 (Rational Expectation of Mistakes∗) At any time t < T after any ht, for any
xt ∈ Zt and At+1 ∈Mt+1, (xt, At+1) ∼ht (xt, {pi(ht,xt)(At+1)}).
The last axiom is a simple temporal consistency assumption adapted from Kreps and
Porteus (1978).
Axiom 14 (Temporal Consistency) At any time t < T after any ht, (xt, {pt+1}) %ht (xt, {qt+1})
if and only if pt+1 %(ht,xt) qt+1.
These axioms characterize the following extension of the CMM, whose functional form is
similar to the representation in Lemma 4 in Kreps and Porteus (1978).
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Definition 8 An SCF % is a Generalized Consistent-Mistakes Model (GCMM) if there ex-
ists, for each history ht, a function Uht : Lt → R, a function Wht : {(xt, ut+1) : ut+1 =
U(ht,xt)(pt+1) for some pt+1 ∈ Lt+1} → R that is strictly increasing and continuous in its
second argument, and a function φht : Uht(Lt) → R++ that is surjective, strictly increasing,
and continuous such that for any time t, history ht, pt ∈ Lt, xt ∈ Zt, and At+1 ∈Mt+1,
Uht(pt) =
∑
(yt,Bt+1)∈supp(pt)
pt(yt, Bt+1)Uht(yt, Bt+1), (16)
Uht(xt, At+1) = Wht
xt, ∑
qt+1∈At+1
ρ(ht,xt) ({qt+1} , At+1)U(ht,xt) (qt+1)
 , (17)
and
ρ(ht,xt)({qt+1}, At+1) =
φ(ht,xt)(U(ht,xt)(qt+1))∑
rt+1∈At+1 φ(ht,xt)(U(ht,xt)(rt+1))
. (18)
Equation (16) is the standard expected utility equation. Equation (17) shows that after
each history, the decision maker has a correct belief about how she will choose from the
next-stage decision problem. Specifically, the decision maker uses her evaluation of the
comparable lottery pi(ht,xt)(At+1) of At+1 to evaluate At+1. Then, to evaluate (xt, At+1), the
decision maker uses an aggregator Wht to aggregate the current-stage consumption xt and
the utility of pi(ht,xt)(At+1). Note that equation (17) also implies
Uht(xt, {qt+1}) = Wht(xt, U(ht,xt)(qt+1)). (19)
Lastly, after each history ht, the decision maker uses the propensity function φht to convert
an alternative’s utility into a measure of propensity for choosing that alternative.
This representation should be applied backward to a decision problem. Starting from
the last stage, after each history hT , equation (16) evaluates each alternative in LT . Then,
equation (18) tells us what the choice probability distribution is over any AT . Equation (17)
shows how to evaluate each pair of (xT−1, AT ), after which we are ready to evaluate each
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alternative in LT−1, and so on.
Theorem 3 An SCF % is a GCMM if and only if it satisfies Axioms 9–15. Moreover, if an
SCF % is a GCMM, then each Uht is unique up to a positive affine transformation; fixing
Uht’s, Wht’s are unique and φht’s are unique up to a positive scalar multiplication.
Many steps in establishing the equivalence between the axioms and the representation are
similar to the proof of Theorem 1. We only briefly describe how we can prove the sufficiency
of the axioms. First, similar to Lemmas 1 and 2, for each history ht, we can show that
%ht satisfies the three axioms from expected utility theory. This helps us pin down Uht .
Similar to Lemmas 3 and 4, we can show that the richness assumption in Gul et al. (2014)
holds. Therefore, we obtain a Luce value Vht(pt) for each alternative pt ∈ Lt. Since Uht
and Vht represent the same preference, we can pin down φht . Lastly, Rational Expectation of
Mistakes∗ and Temporal Consistency imply that there must be a strictly increasing function
f(ht,xt) such that
Uht(xt, At+1) = f(ht,xt)(U(ht,xt)(pi(ht,xt)(At+1))).
This function becomes the Wht function in equation (18).
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